When was Twitter launched?

A friend on Twitter posed a question in the form of a statement recently. She asked, "Still searching for the full official launch birthdate of Twitter! Only got March 2006 so far...Even tweeted the creators!". It was an innocent enough request.

In reading Foucault's Nietzsche, Genealogy, History I can't help but think about posing the response to this question in a different light. Or, as Foucault did in The Subject and Power, ask it a different way. Foucault reformulated the question "what is power?" to "how has power come to operate in our society?". I could do the same with the Twitter question. Rather than "when was Twitter launched" it could become "what is it in our recent past that allowed Twitter to emerge?".

Of course I could be accused of being pedantic and rightly so. But the question of when evades the why and the how. It also performs a function that Foucault was particularly wary of, and that is to inscribe a linearity of history, an assumption of a unified whole having an unbroken line of existence from a distant past to the present.

In establishing his genealogical method (based on the work of Nietzsche) Foucault made it clear that it was with the body, inscribed as it is with the marks and fissures of history, that we must start. Unlike the traditional historical approach where the historian starts at a distant past and moves back to the metaphysical present, the genealogical approach begins at the most recent history - the body - and traces these many fissures and ruptures into the distant past.

In proposing this method of analysis Foucault sought to establish the many and variant influences that serve to shape the notions we hold as universal truths today. Ideals, such as liberty, freedom and rationality, are but creations of society at various stages. Each serve a particular end and purpose in the ebb and flow of a will for power and knowledge.

Foucault warned that, rather than some human rationality being responsible for the emergence of various phenomena, these occurred through accident and cleavage at points far distant from their apparent metaphysical arising. History, then is laden with contingency and breakages that can be observed shaping all phenomena, particularly the human body.

"The body", he said, " is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances. "Effective" history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as a basis for self-recognition or for understanding" (p. 88-9)

So to ask "when was Twitter launched?" is to miss the richness of its emergence into social consciousness. It misses the many accidents that made it possible and the many discourses that prevailed in so many ways to invite its emergence. It treats Twitter as a body whole and complete from its birth.

But it's still a good question. The answer is July 15, 2006.

Sex and repression on dooce

Here's a fascinating entry relating to Armstrong's account of her first kiss. It combines a number of elements anticipated in Foucault. First, the post contains a quote from a letter Armstrong sent to a friend. Foucault would probably read this as a hupomnema or perhaps more accurately as correspondence. Letter writing is an important technology of the self in Foucault's technologies of the self. Second, the account documents a limit moment where Armstrong's bodily experience lead to the creation of new limits. She uses this experience as a source of reflection on her various relationships with power. Finally, she refers to her conscience at play as a result of the experience, a move anticipated in Foucault's understanding of power and subjectivity.

Here is a quote from the post:

David kissed me in I guess what he would consider sensual fury, what I
would consider beastly uncoordination. At about midnight I pulled out of his
driveway never to see him again, well, never to see him for a long, long time. I
was really messed up from the experience even though all we did was smooch. In
the eyes of the Church, I thought, I must be a heathen, a stiffnecked wayward, a
virtual Lamanite. For about three months I lingered on the brink of
self-destruction. David was gone forever far far away in a land called Caltech.
My innocence was gone forever far far away with Nirvana as my only
witness.

And then Armstrong reflects on her subjectivity at the time:

And then I remembered just how distraught I was at that first kiss, how I seriously thought I was going to hell because my tongue had entered another human being's mouth for purposes other than life support. And I so totally and completely don't want my daughter to ever have to go through that sort of self-loathing.


So I'm going to keep this letter -- a single-spaced account of my whole sexual non-history from ages 14-18 that is written in one whole paragraph and stretches over seven pages -- and hope that when the time comes I'll be able to teach my daughter about making healthy personal decisions about sex and about relationships, and about never using the word "uncoordination" because it DOESN'T EXIST.

The hupomnema and correpsondence as techne of the self

Self-writing is likened to the digestion of food. It's all very well to read many books but at some point the bee must return to the hive and turn the pollen into food. Put another way we must stop eating and digest our food (what we read) so that it becomes a part of our soul and serves to shape who we are.

Stultia: A kind of mental agitation which has one jumping from one idea to the next without ever settling. Has a future focus which the hupomnema resists through fixing acquired elements. "The hupomnemata contribute one of the means by which one detaches the soul from concern for the future and redirects it toward contemplation of the past" (Foucault, 1997, p. 212).

The hupomnema is a way to gather together disparate thoughts and ideas and create from these heterogeneous elements one's own truth.

Unification is achieved through the author digesting what is read and written so that concepts become flesh and blood. They are no longer memory but have changed the soul of the author. (p. 213)

In the hupomnema one does not simply regurgitate what is written - much as I'm doing here - but rather makes it one's own through reflection. Nevertheless a genealogy is present in that one can see the genesis of one's identity through the writing in much the same way as one's ancestors can be known by one's face. (p. 214)

Thinking about this as it relates to Armstrong we can see her emergence through her blog. The history of her identity is knowable through her writing.

The hupomnema is more in the style of a personal journal or an account book of what is happening in one's life. Correspondence is something a little different. Both are similar in that they create a reading of what is written. As I'm writing this I'm also reading it (just as when I'm speaking I'm also listening) and this acts as much on me as on the receiver of the communication.

In the process of both teaching and writing we also learn so writing is both benefit to the writer and reader. Which reminds me of the saying "the teacher teaches what he/she needs to learn the most." No truer is that than it is for me this semester. I'm tutoring in Dreamweaver and have never used the programme. Steep learning curve here I come.

Correspondence is more than an extension of the huomnema, a training of oneself. It's a way of manifesting ourselves to another, of being present to the reader - almost as if physically present in a face-to-face meeting - and a way of the writer gazing upon the reader through the content of the letter and in turn offering oneself to the gaze of the reader. There exists a reciprocity of both gaze and examination. My, how much fun would Foucault have with the Internet. (p. 216)

An observation. Correspondence works differently to surveillance in that the authoritative gaze goes in one direction and is, at least as understood as a panopticon, internalised. With correspondence though their is a mutual gaze of authority. Power flows in both directions through the internalisation of the mutual gaze. Blogs, or might we say self-publication on the Internet, are much more akin to correspondence in that there exists in the writer an ever-present sense of an other, an audience, whether that audience is intended or otherwise.

Finally, the letter is a way of presenting to another all that can be said about everyday life, a reviewing of one's everyday life as a form of self-examination. "[I]t is a matter of bringing into congruence the gaze of the other and that gaze which one aims at oneself when one measures one's everyday actions according to the rules of a technique off living" (p. 221).

Armstrong's blog contains much of the banality anticipated by Foucault's concept of the letter. Nappies, bowel movements, drinking, drugs all form part of the complete (almost) revelation of the self to the gaze of botht the self and the other. Over the longer term we can see evidence of the reconcilliation of gazes to which Foucault refers wherein Armstrong writes about matters that were, up until the point of writing, previously unknown by the readers - her family and her supervisors. Through the process of her writing she came to be seen in a congruent manner by both herself and her readers.

Foucault, M. (1997). Self writing. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics: subjectivity and truth. New York: The New Press.

Technologies of the self

Michel Foucault (1998): "This contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality" (p. 19).

In ToS Foucault was more interested in the latter.The Greeks believed it was important to take care of oneself but this was replaced by the now more common concept of know thyself. But in ancient times knowing oneself came out of taking care of oneself. This has occurred possibly due to the Christian idea of self renunciation being essential for salvation. We are also conditioned to accept external rules as the basis of morality rather than something internal. Additionally, since Descartes, self-knowledge is important for the development of the thinking subject.

Epimelesthai: An activity that involves taking care of ones health and wealth. "Taking pains with oneself" (p. 25). What is the self to which Alcibiades was to be concerned? The question really becomes, rather than "what is the self?", "what is the plateau on which the self might be found?". When we take care of the body we don't take care of the self. It's taking care of the activity of taking care of the soul that is care of the self. (p. 25) How can we take care of the soul? First, we must know what it is by looking into a mirror. We must contemplate the divine element of the soul which will then give us the right rules for action. Writing was seen in ancient Greece as an important technique of taking care of the self.

"Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity. The self is something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of writing activity. This is not a modern trait born of the Reformation or of romanticism; it is one of the most ancient Western traditions. It was well established and deeply rotted when Augustine started his Confessions" (p. 27).

This style of writing marked a shift to a new experience of self that involved introspection. Writing and vigilance were connected. A new range of experiences were opened up as a result. 

Anachoresis: As in the retreat of an army, a retreat into oneself, a spiritual retreat, a retiring into the self to uncover, not faults but to "remember rules of action, the main laws of behavior" (p. 34). 

Askesis: A Stoic technique, "not a disclosure of the secret self but a remembering" (p. 35).

Stoics believed the truth was in the logoi, the "teaching of the teachers". You remember what you hear and convert that into rules of conduct and a subjectivity based on this truth. It's not a renunciation of the self or of reality but a progressive working on oneself through the "acquisition and assimilation of truth" and allows one to access the reality of this world rather than some future reality (p. 35).

Truth is tested by melete (meditation), a form of remembering certain truths and arguments so as to have them available during (real or imagained) dialogue and gymnasia (testing oneself through bodily training).

Christianity is both a salvation and confessional religion. One must believe certain truths and dogma and show that you believe them and accept institutional authority. (p. 40) Individuals must know who they are so they can confess their sins and weaknesses to God or another. 

Exemologesis: The public recognition of the fact of ones Christianity and faith, the recognising oneself as a sinner seeking penitence. (p. 41) "The acts by which he punishes himself are indistinguishable from the acts by which he reveals himself." Exemologesis "rubs out the sin and yet reveals the sinner" (p. 42). The thinking behind this revealing behaviour is the appeasement of the judges by being contrite and the way a person should face martyrdom before relinquishing his faith. "The theories and practices of penance were elaborated around the problem of the man who prefers to die rather than to compromise or abandon the faith. The way the martyr faces death is the model for the penitent. For the relapsed to be integrated into the church, he must expose himself voluntarily to ritual martyrdom" (p. 43).

*Interesting aside here in relation to Armstrong who had a similar defiance after being fired. It appears that her ritual martyrdom may have been performed in an attempt to be (re)-integrated back into the folds of the secular church (main-stream society); and we could analyse her pre-dismissal interview with her immediate manager as a way of being offered penance but accepting the offer. A bit speculative possibly but worth considering.*

"Penance is the affect of change, of rupture with self, past, and world. It's a way to sho that you are able to renounce life and self, to show that you can face and accept death. Penitence of sin doesn't have as its target the establishing of an identity but serves instead to mark the refusal of the self., the breaking away from the self: Ego non sum, ego...It represents a break with one's past identity. These ostentatious gestures have the function of showing the truth of the state of being of the sinner. Self-revelation is at the same time self-destruction" (p. 43).

Exemolgesis is not verbal but, rather, ritual and symbolic and the truth about the self is imposed by violent dissociation and rupture, whereas in the Stoic techne self-knowledge is achieved through memorising rules.  

Exagoreusis (p. 42-49): a Christian tradition based on obedience and contemplation; a continual verbalisation of thoughts to the master; all aspects of ones life is addressed in this techne; attempts to still the consciousness through awareness of thoughts that lead to, or away from, God. We must be like the miller who sorts the good grains from the bad or the money changer who examines and weighs coins to determine their value. The way to know if a thought is "good or "bad" is to tell all to a master, a "permanent verbalization of our thoughts" (p. 47);

"By telling himself not only his thoughts but also the smallest movements of consciousness, his intentions, the monk stands in a hermeneutic reations not onlyy to the master but to himself" (p. 47).

*Armstrong may have performed a similar act through creating her readers as a master and continually expressing her inner thoughts on her blog to her reader-masters and therefore being guided to the "right" answer. It appears that Penelope Trunk is on a similar path.* Everything that can't be expressed becomes a sin and therefore the techne relies on a vigorous and all-encompassing confession.

The common theme between exomologesis and exagoreusis is that one "cannot disclose without renouncing" (p. 48). In the latter the permanent disclosure of self and permanent obedience to master renounces the self but it is possible to use this constant verbalisation of the self as a means to create a new self. *Which is what I contend was Armstrong's project.*

Foucault, M. (1988). Technologies of the Self. In L. Martin, H. Gutman & P. Hutton (Eds.), Technologies of the self. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Press.

Technologies of the self

In Technologies of the Self Foucault states:

"[In ancient Greece] it was generally acknowledged that it was good to be reflective, at least briefly...Writing was also important in the culture of taking care of oneself. One of the main features of taking care involved taking notes on oneself to be reread, ...and keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed. Socrates' letters are an example of this self-exercise" (p. 27).

Foucault continues:

"Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity. The self is something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of writing activity...this is not a modern trait born of the Reformation...it is one of the most ancient Western traditions" (p. 27).

And then:

"This genre of epistles shows a side apart from the philosophy of the era. The examination of conscience begins with this letter writing. Diary writing comes later" (p. 30)

Foucault refers here to what he later describes as the hupomnema, the writing of the self into being.

Foucault, M. (1988). Technologes of the Self. In L. Martin, H. Gutman & P. Hutton (Eds.), Technologies of the self. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Press.

Surveillance and the capitalist state | Giddens

Giddens, A. (1995). Surveillance and the capitalist state. In A contemporary critique of historical materialism, 2nd Edn. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Giddens defines surveillance as two connected processes of accumulation of information and of the supervision of the activities of subordinates in a collective. He believes that information gathering is a prime generator of power.

Human beings are knowledgable agents acting within "unacknowledged conditions" and "unintended consequences" of their actions (p. 171).

Whilst he recognises that Foucault connected the abolition of the violence of the spectacle with the rise of capitalism, he maintains that Foucault's connection between the factory and the prison were too close to be sustained. Rather, he notes that workplaces are not, as with prisons, "total institutions" (a phrase he credits to the work of Goffman) in which resistance may develop. As a result Foucault's "docile bodies" become not so docile after all and become knowledgeable agents. (p. 173)

He notes that the freedom of labour in capitalist systems are really just a sham and create the exploitation of workers through more subtle means, but he points out that the rise of "mere bourgeois freedoms" have lead to the development of genuine gains in judicial reforms allowing and encouraging the formation of organised labour movements which have challenged the hegemony of capitalism.

Giddens maintains that Foucault's ideas about the sequestration of prisoners become more a comment about the parts of capitalist society that commodify, regulate, and smooth time, removing from our day-to-day lives those aspects which are directly connected to the ebb and flow of nature. (p. 173)

Despite his criticism of Foucault, Giddens recognises the importance of surveillance to studies of capitalism. He observes that "classical social theory" - and by that I assume he refers to Marxism - did not recognise the threat to personal liberties from systems of surveillance. (p. 174)

Finally he points to what he sees as the oppressive potential for a combining of a Taylorist supervision of workers with an information collection mechanisms that result in anonymous "technical control" (p. 176).

A diagram of panoptic surveillance | Elmer

Notes from:

Elmer, G. (2003). A diagram of panoptic surveillance. New media and society, 5(2), 231-247. Retrieved June 7, 2008, from SAGE Publications database.

Not proof-read, read generously.

The development of a theory of panoptic surveillance is often hampered by an overly literal interpretation of the panopticon.

Criticisms of panopticism are made in three broad categories:

1. The shifting of architectures of surveillance from "carceral enclosure" to databases which plays to debates about invasions of personal privacy.
   
2. Questioning of the "automatic disciplinary effect of panopticism" and argues that people voluntarily participate in their own surveillance through exchanging private information about themselves for reward. These critiques miss the automatic nature of information collection on the web and the inability for opt-out.
   
3. Through new media technologies the panopticon is now a synopticon where the many watch the few. This critique relies on an understanding that panoptic power comes from corporeal observation whereas it is derived from the architecture of light which is suggestive of surveillance

Each of these critiques are useful in further developing the concept of the panopticon but each is limited by their "heuristic points of departure" (p. 233).

Elmer sets out to explicate the diagrammatic aspects of panoptic surveillance and to explain the continuous way consumers and their data selves are integrated into the collection of personal information processes.

The panopticon relies on the hegemony of light and vision as central to the development of Foucault's thesis of self-discipline and governance. The all seeing gaze is both marked and masked, visible yet invisible, by the architecture and arrangement of light. Thus, those subject to this unseen gaze assume its presence and modify their behaviour.

The panopticon is a "system of light and language" (p. 234) where the collection of information is foundational and essential to the operation of a system of classification and individuation. Deleuze in Postsripts points to this matter.

Foucault's theories of surveillance maintain a lingering reliance on a spatial dimension but it is equally important to note the data gathering aspects of the system which, in effect, begin before a person's incarceration within the confines of the panopticon. The customers were already classified and separated before their violent enclosure. Foucault was concerned with a generalisable system of power rather than the development of a specific architecture; but how might his system be imagined in the face of highly mobile modern subjects.

Elmer notes Foucault's development of theories of power through reference to the confessional which exposed inner-most secret self and which went unquestioned as a means for the assertion of power.

Criticisms of panopticism critique the technology rather than the technique (p. 235).

Roger Clarke (Information technolgy and dataveillance, 1998) proposes that surveillance is enabled and augmented by technologies but he does not address the specific moments of data gathering. At the data gathering moment the process of collection of information and surveillance is automated in a way reminiscent of the panopticon.

Elmer notes the work of Tim Mathiesen who proposes the idea of the synopticon which inverts or locates a parallel panopticon enabling the many to watch the few via the agency of mass media; and discipline arises in this process from a disciplining of our consciousness through the media message. Elmer develops an argument that TiVo can be understood synoptically noting the way the system learns, recommends and customises (other systems such as Kwikflix perform similarly). These recommendations, based as they are on aggregates of anonymous viewing patters, raise questions about how they may may be imagined within panopticism. Elmer argues for a redrawing of the panoptic diagram.

Such a rethinking was specifically considered by Deleuze in Postscript on societies of control in which he noted that we had already ceased to be members of societies of discipline and had now become modulated by and within societies of control. Signatures and numbers which marked individuality and place within a mass had given away to a code which denies or permitted access to information and locations.

Deleuze's diagram describes a digitally languaged system of ever changing shape and size which described the decentralised movement and flow of information throughout a network.

Elmer mentions "simulation" a great deal in relation to technologies but I'm unsure if he means that technologies tend to simulate the corporeal flow. If anyone can help me understand this I'd appreciate the help.

Deleuze and Guattari introduce the possibility of mapping the continuity between light and language. Again, I'm not sure what this means. Help anyone?

In another work, Deleuze proffers the concept of the rhizome as a diagram which evokes a sense of the space between architectural drawing and built form.

One of the key claims of panopticism is its ability to function with little or no supervision as a mechanism for automatic and constant observation and data collection. (p. 243)

In the panoptic diagram consumers are both rewarded and punished for their behaviour. Rewarded with an all-too-familiar set of images and content that leads to the consumption of more of the same and punished with extra work when attempting to seek out the unfamiliar (p. 245).

A plague on the panopticon | Green

Further to my earlier, and very brief post about Green's A plague on the panopticon I'll add a few more detailed notes here.

Green argues that Foucault's concept of Panopticism is a defective metaphor that promotes misunderstandings about the way surveillance works in the real world. Green attests: "Despite Foucault's claims to the contrary, surveillance is ultimately conceived as the handmaiden of dominant power" (p. 27). He argues that the panopticon as a metaphor does not sufficiently address the complexities of power and misses an opportunity to recognise the benefits (lowering crime, provision of customised products and services) that flow from surveillance.

Green proposes the rethinking of Foucault's observations of the management of plagues and believes that a new and more fruitful way of understanding the workings - and the benefits - of surveillance is possible as a result. He opines that Foucault's concept of Panopticism invokes a form of totalising power from which it is impossible to escape. For Green, a failing by Foucault of not delimiting who is in power and who has power creates a paradigm that is difficult to sustain. He wants to see - and here he relies on Gramsci - a restoration of human agency and an essential freedom of the individual from power.

He dismisses observations of the applicability of Panopticism as being overly dismissive of the downgrading of "liberty, 'personhood' and resistance" (p. 30) and points to a "legion" (p. 31) of problems with the concept. Citing both Giddens and Lyon he critiques panopticism as tending to the technological determinist and claims that the individuation central to the panopticon, far from destroying individuality, provides a way for the individual to break free from the "mass of autonomy" (p. 31).

Suggesting plague response as a relevant way to conceive of surveillance, Green notes the utility of the categorisation of healthy and sick people during a plague event, and points to the integration of surveillance within the fabric of community. He points to the messiness of the plague form of surveillance - people were able to hide in dark corners - and this enables a degree of access to individual resistance that he believes Foucault did not permit within the panopticon. Such a messy understanding of the effects of surveillance is far more contemporary he suggests in that it provides for a clearer understanding of the uneven manner of the deployment of surveillance.

He points to the inversion of surveillance through technologies such as digital cameras and video recorders that captured the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 and astutely observes the way resistance movements such as the Chiapas, Zapatista Army, and other change advocates use technology to maintain surveillance over authority. Green believes such an inversion of surveillance was not contemplated in Foucault's panopticon.

Green, S. (1999). A plague on the panopticon: surveillance and power in the global information economy. Information, Communication & Society, 2(1), 26-44. Retrieved June 7, 2008, from Informaworld database.

Critical application of Panopticism

In applying Foucault's concept of Panopticism to the surveillance of personal blogs I will use Deleuze's critique found in Postscripts. I should also use Foucault's own critique based on his development of the concept of pastoral power as set out in Subjectivity and Power. Pastoral power is much more modular and smooth then the exercise of power through the spatially bound panopticon. Pastoral power retains a sense of the authoritative gaze that is more reliant on the revealing of a person's inner thoughts than is found in the gaze of the panopticon. Pastoral power involves a greater level of participation by the subject although the aspects of internalisation of governance have similarities.

Productive power relations

Foucault believed that power was productive. In this matter he stood opposed to the Marxist view that power was something against which the proletariat must resist. Class struggle was not viewed by Foucault as fundamental. But I wonder what he means by productive. Perhaps it was linked to his observation that power, in addition to constraining and limiting, also seduced and induced. By this observation would we be able to assert that relationships between lovers were relationships of power? How is seduction productive?

Governmental rationality | Colin Gordon

Foucault defines government thus: "'the conduct of conduct'" (p. 2); in Gordon's words "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons." Sounds suspiciously like Foucault's definition of power - actions taken on actions of others - I wonder if he saw any difference. In all likelihood this is Foucault saying that power is diffuse and dispersed throughout the social body. Power and government come, not from one external source that is supra the social body but from within its very nexus (Subject and Power). Power is not violence or force and relies on a free subject - in my words it's a two way multi-directional process. Power is an "endless and open strategic game" (p. 5).



Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: an introduction. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (pp. 1-52). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

On governmentality | Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault traces a genealogy of governmentality from feudal systems, the sovereign ruler, to the development of the art of government through the agency of the economy.

Foucault is interested in the state and how the state might, through multivalent means, put effect to government. He traces the way the feudal system gave way to this art of government with the interstitial manifestations of the art represented through the family as a metaphor for the economy. The family soon came to be seen as a thin, poorly structured means by which one might theorise the economy, and thus was born the notion of the population which could be observed and measured and assessed. Population then became the end game, the final outcome, for government, which must firstly consider the ways in which the wealth, well-being, and growth of this population might be effected. The family became a mere instrument in the collection of data and was lost altogether as the central unit for the economy.

"The population now represents more the end of government than the power of the sovereign; the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, aware, vis-a-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it" (p. 100).

And again, importantly I believe for my thesis:

"Interest at the level of the consciousness of of each individual who goes to make up the population, and interest considered as the interest of the population regardless of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of the individuals who compose it, this is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the governement of population: the birth of a new art, or at any rate of a range of absolutely new tactics and techniiques" (p. 100).

Foucault notes the impact of the emergence of the population as central to the governance of the state. Far from sovereignty being replaced by the political science of governance he notes its continued centrality through an attempt "to see what what juridical and institutional form, what foundation in the law. could be given to the sovereignty that characterizes a state" (p. 101). My interest here is on the word 'state'. Foucault refers to a nation-state but equally the state could refer to a corporate-state against which bloggers are opposed. Corporate-states seek their own sovereignty from the laws of commerce and employment from which they derive the exercise of power over a personal blogger. In other words, a network of systems, agreements, and political aspirations stand opposed to the hoped-for right of free expression of the personal blogger. Sovereignty therefore is distributed, diffuse, multivalent.

The management of a population reinforced the centrality of the disciplines to governance through the arrangement and aggregation of things - assets, artifacts, people, groups.

Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (pp. 87-105). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Aesthetics as Ethics Part 2

Came across a couple of neat definitions today in McNaly (1994).

Autonomy: "a process in which the interrogation of the established limits identity leads to an increased capacity for independent thought and behaviour (p. 145)." This constant interrogation fights off the individualizing and normalizing effects of power. Foucault retained an Enlightenment notion of which McNaly describes as a state of "positive liberty": an "individual's ability to exercise critical judgement free from the influence of dominant beliefs and desires" (p. 144). I wonder what is meant by a dominant belief. How does a belief become "dominant"? Does my belief that I feel tired and need to sleep become a dominant belief that disables my autonomy?

Subject: is subject to another through dependence and this normalising view of the self is tied to a person's own identity through "conscience or self-knowledge (p. 142)." I think here of the way that psychology and psychiatry create a normalised view of a person, or at least encourage people to become normal. Foucault cringed at the thought of this normalisation and instead wanted scholars to fight normalising power so as to allow for the development of the pure aesthetics of the self.

Freedom from normalising forms of individuality come from exploring the limits of our subjectivity; and these limits can come from our sexuality or any other number of normalising structures. (p. 145)



McNaly, L. (1994). Foucault. Oxford: Polity Press.

Aesthetics as Ethics

Correction: The following post refers to Lois McNaly and should properly read Lois McNay. My apology to the author.

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In the book, Foucault, Lois McNaly (1994, p. 149) critiques Michel Foucault's notion of aestheticism or the aesthetics of the self/existence as being overly reliant on the heroization of the self.

Foucault utilised Baudelaire the Dandy as a way to exemplify the way an individual might bring themselves forth into the world; a way of producing oneself as a work of art. This work of art is said to have a non-productive quality and by that I believe Foucault was suggesting the production of art for arts sake, not the production of art in some attempt at communicative reason. It sounds as though he was attempting to be elitist by having people create themselves as pieces of high art that served 'no' purpose. But in reality he was attempting to bring art to the grasp of all individuals. We can each create our own lives as a work of art without first finding some form of hidden existential being lurking deep below the surface. Foucault, I believe, was simply attempting, through Baudelaire the Dandy, to demonstrate that self mastery was immanent and immediately available for all human beings. No need to wait for the shrink, just start producing art.

But McNaly's critique is leveled against what she sees as the underlying gendered tones of the invocation of Foucault's heroic male artist. McNaly believes that the subtext of Foucault's Dandy is unaddressed and therefore the aesthetics have become fetishized; given more meaning and power then they deserve.

I don't share McNaly's criticism. Foucault might have employed any other of a myriad illustrations to explain and demonstrate his notion. Instead he chose a Dandy artist who become heroized by academics; and its regrettable this occurred. For me, Foucault was simply attempting to provide a sense of the now available to each of us. In the same way as an artist stills the mind in the creative moment, Foucault was attempting to explain something difficult, if not impossible, to understand at the level of the intellect.

McNaly, L. (1994). Foucault. Oxford: Polity Press.

Self-writing, frank and fearless speech

I've been reading The Political Mapping of Cyberspace by Jeremy Crampton (2003) after finding a comment about one of my posts on Jeremy's blog. Jeremy's comment lead me to begin an exploration of the terms "hupomnemata" (self-writing) and "parrhesia" (frank and fearless speech, particularly spoken against the powerful) (p. 107). This post, therefore, is an attempt to distill and focus those parts of Crampton's writing that have particular relevance to my upcoming thesis. I claim no special knowledge or understanding of the topics about which he speaks and invite any meaningful critique of this summary.

One of the struggles I've been waging is to distill a thesis statement; and have had even more difficulty conceiving of a way into the discussion of the tensions experienced between employee bloggers and their employers. In this regard Crampton's approach may prove highly valuable. He frames his own work as a focus on the "contact point" (p. 17) between Foucault's concepts of the technologies of the self (he explains these in detail later in the book) and the technologies of domination utilised by those in power. The overlap of these two forms of government - the government of the individual self by the self and the regulation of institutions - produce a domain of contestation and the necessary recalcitrance and resistance required for the existence of a power relationship. Looked at in this manner the tension between employee and employer has two connected but separate domains that continually bear and act on one another.

Expectedly Crampton invests a section of his book on the technologies of the self in which he critiques the concept of "confession" (he notes that there has, to this point, been little meaningful discourse on the concept despite its centrality and importance to Christian societies) and explains some of techniques of self such as hupomnemata and parrhesia.

Crampton notes the importance of confession of truth about oneself in the process of authentication of self in cyberspace (user names and passwords require confession of truth to a system/person of power) and without this confession the authentic self is denied access.

He points out that the "technologies" (of the self) to which Foucault refers have a broader meaning then how we might imagine technology (computers, calculators, electricity grids); a production, a fabrication, a bringing forth, not something that is hidden, needing to be found, but something to be produced as an artist or craftsmen would their work (p. 84). In other words:

"What is brought into existence in technologies of the self is precisely the truth about oneself" (p. 85).

These "techne" are techniques that mould, shape, and produce the self. As opposed to a self that is already existent, the self becomes a deliberate act performed and produced by the self - one must work to be attain the gay life he notes Foucault as saying (no doubt this idea might not go down well for those who propose the existence of the gay brain, but that's a discussion for another day). One of these techne is the already mentioned hupomnemata (it's a Greek word), a way of self-writing, not as some form of Christian confessional in order to reveal ones true self, but as a way to transform the self through the process or act of writing. Crampton believes that such non-confessional self-writing has rich potential for the practice of the self, a framework in other words, or a process in which we might write our self into being, or finally a way of "working on oneself in the context of a community (world)" (p. 95).

It is this sense of community that Crampton uses to direct his attention to the matter of the world of blogs; personal online journals around which develop various levels of community. But Crampton is aware of the manner in which much of the understanding about cyberspace in which blogs exist hinge on the twin concepts of authenticity and confession; understandings that he holds has problematic. In relation to the concept of confession he notes that the confessing of one's sins (or the truth about oneself on the psychiatrists couch) are designed both to allow for the emergence of the pure, sinless self and for the normalisation of the individual (how far from the norm do our sexual tastes, behaviours, and psyche vary?). He further notes the all-pervasive nature of the confession (TV shows, fields of medicine, law) each reliant on the revelation of the truth of the inner self and each creating, more or less, the normalisation of the subject. Little wonder, therefore, that the concept of the confession has been taken to the extreme by scholars such as Dodge and Kitchin and Turkle who propose that the confessional finds its ultimate manifestation in the online world where cyber-dwellers may disavow their own bodies in a space that allows finally the discovery of one's true, but heretofore, lost identity.

As appealing as these theories may sound, says Crampton, they cannot be sustained in that they conceive of cyberspace as being a separate, heterotopian (with a nod of the head to Foucault?) space as opposed to another part of the real world in which various technologies (including the Internet and "cyberspace") has been introduced. Technologies and cyberspace did not form the real world but rather came out of the real world as ways to make life more enjoyable/easier/more comfortable. Insofar as cyberspace is conceived of as a separate space, Crampton claims that the confession and authentication required to access this space requires or creates a form of subjectivity by which people become "discriminable individuals with identifiable selves, who dwell in physical space, and who produce the truth about themselves in order to enter the separate domain of cyberspace..." (p. 100). And in the process of the conceiving of cyberspace as a separate space subjects are normalised, cyberspace becomes opposed to real space, and human beings are denied the opportunity that cyberspace provides for them to practice the self.

As part of this practice of the self blogs provide individuals with a means by which to resist the forces of individualisation and provide a process through which they might work on oneself to fully become. Crampton posits that "blogging [is] a deliberate strategy of resistance against the normalized, confessional conception of the self" (p. 104) and an expression of "a care of the self through techniques of self-writing" (p. 105). Bloggers, he proposes, through their writing, develop themselves rather then expose a previously hidden inner truth from within. In other words the self of the blogger is constructed and brought to life through self-writing not discovered through the peeling away of layers via confessions.

Connected with the idea of resistance (and I will say connected also to blogging) Crampton builds the Greek concept of parrhesia on which Foucault built a considerable volume of work in the early 1980's. Crampton shows that parrhesia means "frankness; speaking everything on your mind and not holding back" (p. 107) but the concept also means that there must be a telling of what one knows to be true (not in the evidential manner of the word but through something known morally; to speak one's own truth I would say) and an element of risk or danger in the telling (risk of losing a job, risk of losing a relationship, risk of beheading). Parrhesia stems from a sense of duty, is made without coercion, and does not share the same sense of compulsion found in the concept of confession.

In the context of power relationships (I imagine here the tension between employer/employee) Crampton explains Foucault's notion of the "parrhesiastic contract" (p. 108) wherein a ruler, invested with great powers, allows and encourages courtiers and advisors to speak their mind, assuring them of their bodily safety despite the 'truth' they might tell. What is curious and fascinating about this contract is what each of the parties bring to the relationship; the powerful has the power but not the truth, the subject has the truth but not the power. Therefore the two become complicit in each other's strategies and in the maintenance of the power relationship. On the one hand the rulers "govern with a light hand" (p. 108) permitting and encouraging the governed to publish and speak openly and freely, on the other, the ruled legitimate the rulership of those in power through the maintenance of their ongoing relationship with the rulers.

Such a legitimation does not suggest that the contract is fixed either by its terms, domain, or consideration. Rather the lines of a parrhesiastic contract are always, or at least often, being negotiated and renegotiated. Using the example of Diogenes and Alexander, Crampton explains how new ground and new lines of contestation are opened and created; but these are not just any battles. Unlike struggles that react to various instances of the implementation of power, parrhesiastic struggles, in the true manner of the Cynics, question the very foundation of - the basis of - power. The parrhesiast is concerned less with winning the debate at hand and more with the addressing the very relevance and structure of the debate.

It is worth pointing as an aside here the relevance of the work of Jodi Dean in regard to the location of power structures within society. As I have posted previously, Dean's critique of Habermas recognises the messiness of civil society and the importance of recognising the fragility of embodied human beings, and of thus allowing power relationships to contest the very structure and formation of the debates in pubic discourse. In this regard Foucault, Crampton, and Dean all share a common conception of the problematics of the public sphere and the sense of possibility arising from the recognition of the existence of power structures deeply embedded within the social body. It is this continual resistance to power at all levels of society which Crampton believes holds great promise for the possibility of change.

Crampton's book is more far-reaching than I have portrayed here, delving into the world of cartography and the politics of the mapping of cyberspace (hence the name of his book). However I have attempted to constrain my comments here to matters which affect and address concepts that may be covered in my thesis. These concepts must now include the technologies of the self as suggested by Foucault and techne including hupomnemata and parrhesia, both of which go directly to the methods used by the employee blogger. Whether using blogs as a process for writing oneself into being in the world or used as a means for questioning the foundations of authority and bringing about change Crampton's work is highly informative and worthy of further investigation.

Reference

Crampton, J. (2003). The political mapping of cyberspace. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Power and resistance

Struggle and resistance - the self-expression of a free subject - are inevitable wherever and whenever power is exercised (Smart, 1985). In the context of blogging this concept is important to keep in mind.

In the case of Heather B. Armstrong, the struggle began before she was fired whereby she attempted to obfuscate the identities of the individuals about whom she was blogging. One could reasonably speculate that Armstrong may have been aware that, had she blogged about clearly identifiable real life characters, her firing would have come much earlier and with much more certainty. Her attempts at blurring identities could be seen, at least in Foucauldian terms, as means of struggle and resistance (if you're going to catch me I'm going to make it difficult for you.

Ellen Simonetti continues her efforts to seek redress and justice in the wake of her firing. Signs of her struggle are clearly evident on her blog as she points out what she alleges to be hypocrisy on the part of Delta Airlines and encourages readers, by way of various small advertisements, to take up the issue of free speech in the work place.

These examples are particularly narrow observations of the applications of the mechanisms of power and the responses they might receive.

Smart, B. (1985). Michel Foucault. Sussex: Ellis Horwood Limited.

Thesis statement and outline

I've just met with my supervisor and what came out of that meeting was a few ideas - lots in fact- of the direction my thesis could go. So here are my thoughts in very raw form and quite unedited.

We started out with what I meant be emancipation and my answer was that I really didn't have an answer that was theoretically sound. What I intended from the use of that word was to highlight the struggle with employers through which personal bloggers often proceed. To my way of thinking these struggles reminded me of some form of Judeo/Christian struggle to achieve enlightenment. Through a struggle comes a realization of ones self and an understanding of our limits and abilities. There's something mythically compelling about David and Goliath stories where the small and disadvantaged has taken on the behemoth and won. That's the notion I was attempting to convey; but I understand that there are significant theoretical difficulties.

I've been reading a lot in and around Foucault's theories of power/knowledge, and I believe this may be fruitful ground. Much can be said about the way in which personal blogs that mention or relate to an employees work are creating a new domain for the contestation of power. They provide a new means to articulate a new form of power relationship between employer and employee.

The nature of a personal blog is a many faceted artifact. Is it a public or private space (a blog about work can be password protected and available to only family and close friends or it can be available to anyone with an Internet connection), how does technology (RSS feeds, blog aggregation sites) change the nature of the blog, what effects are created by the use of pseudonyms, and what can be said about fictionalised accounts of a person's working life?

Then there are the numerous examples of bloggers getting dooced (fired for the content of their blogs) and what these examples tell us about the perceived nature of the power relationship between employer and employee. We've tentatively agreed to focus on just one example, that of Heather B. Armstrong. Armstrong, on her blog dooce, made a number of remarks (using various methods to obfuscate the real life identities of the characters in the narrative) about her work and this led to her being fired. Much of the literature I've reviewed to this point treats Armstrong's (and other employee bloggers) from the perspective of established power structures; the rights to free speech emanating from the US First Amendment and 'at will' US employment contracts whilst only a small body of literature has focussed on the underlying negotiation and renegotiation of existing power structures as a result of Armstrong's blog. The nature of the blog and Armstrong's case could form a second chapter.

I believe there is enough published about Armstrong's blog and her sacking from which I could build an extensive Foucauldian analysis about the agonism of the power relationship between employer and employee. I have not read sufficiently to describe two further chapters here but certainly I would want to address issues of surveillance and the hierarchical gaaze (Panopticism complimented by Deleuze's Postscript on Societies of Control) that lead to her blog being found, the examination of her blog (the obectification of Armstrong-as-blogger who then becomes a subject in the realm of power that has now extended to the Internet), and normalising judgement wherein the employer refers back to notions of normality as defined by management, (possibly) corporate lawyers, and popular business practice surrounding the censorship of employees. I could also discuss the matter of the power relationship existing between her and her employer and the ways that is agonised and the ways by which the intransigence of Armstrong's free will became evident. There is much more that can be found in Foucault's Power and the Subject that could provide fascinating analysis of the scenario. Finally I could turn to the matter of how Armstrong's actions have changed the balance and nature of the power relationship by turning the gaze back to the company (hmmm, Armstrong didn't name the firm she worked for but this would work with the QueenofSky example) where the company's work practices became the object of observation after the fact of the termination (I think I could build something here, but it's early days in my thinking).

Might it be possible to uncover new perspectives and understandings about the power relationship between Armstrong and her employer by utilising a Foucauldian analysis of the various texts that serve to define the events related to the termination of her employment?

I'm pressing the publish button without proof-reading so don't be to upset if you find a typo or three.

A response to the Jodi Dean post

A response to my post about Jodi Dean can be found here. A comment on that post raises issues about my use of the term emancipation and I will continue to discuss this matter with my supervisor. I have so much to read and learn about emancipation. I may just stick with a Foucauldian analysis of blogging by employees in relation to power/knowledge and Panopticism.

This journey is both exciting and frightening.

Personal emancipation

I'm having trouble with the term personal emancipation and the way it is so related to Kantian notions of emancipatory struggle. Perhaps something more along the lines of 'sites of resistance' which refers back to Foucault's Power and the Subject and possibly to some of Deleuze's work might work better. I want to demonstrate struggle, but more from the perspective of an essential human freedom.

New Spaces | Foucault

Just read a book chapter written by Foucault (1998) on the subject of new spaces. He describes the way that looking in a mirror creates an image of the self in a place the self is not, but the means for the creation of the image - the mirror - is real. He describes "heterotopias", new spaces that, like the mirror, create new imagined spaces; or perhaps they in fact create new planes of spaces.

In any case the article may be worth going back and reviewing. It may be possible to apply the term heterotopia to the Internet and to blogs; spaces which aren't the real person but are perhaps an even more systemised version of the real person.

Foucault, M. (1998). Different Spaces. Aesthetics, method, and epistemology. P. Rabinow. New York, The New Press.

Accessed from Curtin University e-reserve April 3, 2008.